Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust, dba
Cottonwood Creek Apartments and Shangri La
UBO v. Shawn Turner and Larsen, Kirkham and
Turner : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael F. Skolnick; Kipp and Christian; attorneys for appellees.
D. Kendall Perkins; attorney for appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Crestwood Cove v. Turner, No. 20040539 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5087

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CRESTWOOD COVE APARTMENTS
BUSINESS TRUST, dba COTTONWOOD
CREEK APARTMENTS and SHANGRI LA
UBO,
Appellant,
vs.

:
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal No 20040539
District Court No. 020911135

SHAWN TURNER and LARSEN, KIRKHAM Oral Argument Priority No. 15
& TURNER,
Appellee.

:

D. Kendall Perkins (2566)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants
2417 E. 9110 So
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: 801-942-2078
Michael F. Skolnick
KIPP and CHRISTIAN P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-521-3773

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CRESTWOOD COVE APARTMENTS
BUSINESS TRUST, dba COTTONWOOD
CREEK APARTMENTS and SHANGRI LA
UBO,
Appellant,
vs.

:
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal No 20040539
District Court No. 020911135

SHAWN TURNER and LARSEN, KIRKHAM Oral Argument Priority No. 15
& TURNER,
Appellee.

:

D. Kendall Perkins (2566)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants
2417 E. 9110 So
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: 801-942-2078
Michael F. Skolnick
KIPP and CHRISTIAN P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-521-3773

LIST OF PARTIES
All parties to this appeal and the proceedings below are listed in the case caption.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF PARTIES

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

INTRODUCTION

1

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

3

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

4

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESENTATION

5

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

10

1.
2.

3.

The trial court erred in finding there were no contested issues of fact
relating to the question of attorney malpractice

10

Turner's conduct constituted malpractice, and such malpractice was
the proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA being burdened with a
redemption fee of nearly one million dollars, losing possession
of the apartment complex and being placed in the position of
being forced to mitigate its damages by settling, to its detriment,
with UAW and DLM. Causation is a question of fact for
the jury to decide

13

Under the facts of this case, it was error for the trial court to find
that SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a malpractice
action against Turner

14

ADDENDUM 1 - Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

ADDENDUM 2 - Utah Code Ann. 1996 § 78-36-3
ADDENDUM 3 - Memorandum Decision dated May 5,1998
ADDENDUM 4 - Turner's Brief in Response filed May 26,1998
ADDENDUM 5 - Docket of Supreme Court re SHANGRI-LA
Appeal
ADDENDUM 6 - Affidavit of Stanley L. Wade

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
STATE CASES
Allan v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 798 P.2d 733, 734 (Utah 1990)

5

Cozzaa v. Steuer 694 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio App. 8Dist 1997)

16

DePugh v. Sladjoe 111 Ohio App. 2d 296, 676 N.E.2d 132 (1996)

17

Glencore, LTD v. Ince 972 P.2d 376 (Utah 19998)

17

Marline v. Barker 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996)

12, 17

Jackson v. Dabney 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982)

5, 20

Lucas v. Hamm 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825
364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961) Cert. Den. 368 U.S. 987,
82 S. Ct. 603, 7 L.Ed.2d 525 (1962)

10, 20

Monastra v. D 'Amore 111 Ohio App.3d 296, 676 N.E.2d 132 (1996)

17

Ong Int 7 (USA) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp. 850 P.2d 447 452 (Utah 1993)

6

Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association v. Sikes 590 So.2d 1051
(Fla.Ct. App. 1991)
Segal v. Segal 632 So.2d 76 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993)
Smith v. Lewis 13 Cal. 3d 349, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 598 (1975)....

14
14
19

Sutherland v. Milstein 266 A.D.2d 33, 608 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1999 N.Y.App.Div)

16

Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1992)

5, 13

Watkiss & Saperstien v. Williams 931 P.2d 840 (Utah 1996)

19

Williams v. Barber 756 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988)
Young v. Bridwell 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686, 690 (1968)

10, 20
13

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. 1996 § 78-2a-3 (j)
Utah Code Ann. 1996 § 78-36-10
Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1.1 Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

3
4, 6, 12
2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 18, 21
18

TREATISES
Legal Malpractice § 21.16 (5th Ed. 2000) Mallen & Smith
Legal Malpractice 2, Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffery Smith
§ 27.7 at 641-42 (3rd Ed. 1989)

14
18

INTRODUCTION
In the underlying case, an apartment complex, worth in excess of three million
dollars, owned by Appellant's predecessor in interest, SHANGRI-LA GARDEN
APARTMENTS and SHANGRI-LA APARTMENTS, Inc., a Nevada Corporation.
(Hereinafter, SHANGRI-LA) was sold at a sheriffs sale for $8,000.00 to satisfy a
$4,767.00 judgment. For reasons not relevant to this appeal, the judgment debtor did not
redeem the property within the six-month redemption period. It subsequently filed an
action to set aside the sheriffs sale and/or to extend the redemption period to avoid
forfeiture of the multi-million dollar property. Shortly after the sheriffs sale, the
purchaser quit-claimed its interest in the apartment, for $11,197.00, to UAW Properties,
L.C. and DLM Investments, L.L.C.,(Hereinafter, UAW and DLM) which had been
created to speculate on the property. SHANGRI-LA filed its action seeking to set aside
the sheriffs sale and/or to extend the redemption period in Third District Court Case No
970902686 QT. UAW and DLM responded contesting the setting aside of the sheriffs
sale and extension of the redemption period and counterclaimed, asserting in part,
conversion and the right to impose the Utah Unlawful Detainer Act. At trial, SHANGRILA was represented by Shawn Turner of the firm of LARSEN, KIRKHAM & TURNER
(Hereinafter, Turner). UAW AND DLM were represented by Steven B. Mitchell of
BIRBIDGE & MITCHELL (Hereinafter, Mitchell). The matter was heard at a two day
bench trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge. SHANGRI-LA, as

represented by Turner, did not contest the application of the Utah Unlawful Detainer Act,
either in the framing of the issues by the pleadings or at trial, up to the completion of
presentation of evidence and final argument. At final argument of the matter, the trial
court asked Mitchell to specify what he was claiming on his counterclaim. Mitchell
answered that his claim included a claim for unlawful detainer comprised of damages
equal to the rents received on the apartments from the time of the unlawful detainer until
the action was filed, which rents were stipulated to be $304,333.00 and which damages
should be trebled according to the Unlawful Detainer Act. The court asked Turner for his
response to Mitchell's claim for damages equal to the received rents, wherein Turner in
effect agreed with Mitchell's claim. The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on
May 5, 1998, which in page five thereof, recited that the court felt the parties had not
adequately addressed the issue of treble damages and requested briefing of the issue. In
his brief on the issue, Turner, for the first time, argued that the Unlawful Detainer Statute
did not apply. Turner did not at any time raise the argument that the rule governing
redemption, Rule 69 (j) (3) and (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Paragraph (j)(3) limits
what fees a buyer at sheriffs sale can collect in a redemption situation; paragraph (j)(7)
limits the application of rents from redeemed property to a credit upon redemption money
to be paid.
The trial court entered judgment awarding damages for unlawful detainer of
$304,333.00, which damages the court trebled according to the unlawful detainer statute;
thus, establishing a redemption amount of nearly one million dollars. SHANGRI-LA
retained new counsel and filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's decision.

Possession of the apartment complex was turned over to UAW and DLM. Almost
immediately, the apartments began to suffer from inept management and inadequate
maintenance, to the degree that the property began to suffer diminution in value by reason
of the effect of the inept management, inadequate maintenance and the effect of a fire that
occurred in one of the apartment buildings, damage from which was not seasonably
repaired. SHANGRI-LA was not able to raise the nearly one million dollar redemption
fee. SHANGRI-LA was advised by its new counsel that disposition of the appeal could
take an additional two or three years. To be able to re-take possession of the apartment
complex and eliminate the diminution in value being experienced, and to mitigate its
damages, SHANGRI-LA negotiated a settlement of the matter with UAW and DLM,
which included a dismissal with prejudice of the appeal after briefing thereof, but prior to
the determination of the appeal. Plaintiffs in this action, successors in interest to
SHANGRI-LA, then brought this action. (The apartment complex mentioned, was
transferred to Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust, a Utah Business Trust after
the occurrence above outlined, but to avoid confusion, the successor in interest,
Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust will continue to be referred to as SHANGRILA.)
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of §78-2a-3 (j)
Utah Code Ann. (1996) (Cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
SHANGRI-LA alleges that Turner failed to contest the application of the Utah
Unlawful Detainer Act, §78-36-3; Treble damage provisions, §78-36-10, Utah Code
Ann., prior to the completion of evidence and final argument and failed to raise the
appropriate provisions of Rule 69 (j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as limiting the
amount that could be legitimately assessed as part of the redemption fee. Turner's failure
resulted in the improper assessment of a redemption fee of nearly one million dollars, a
fee SHANGRI-LA did not have. SHANGRI-LA, alleges that to mitigate its damages and
eliminate the continuing diminution of value of the apartment complex, it negotiated a
settlement agreement with UAW and DLM, and as a part thereof, dismissed its appeal of
the trial court's ruling, prior to determination of the appeal.
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that Turner's conduct did not constitute
malpractice or malpractice per se.

2.

If Turner's conduct constituted malpractice, was such malpractice the proximate
cause of SHANGRI-LA's incurring a redemption fee of nearly one million dollars
and was such malpractice the proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA being placed in
the situation of having to settle with UAW and DLM where it paid one hundred
thousand dollars, abandoned fire insurance proceeds, lost rent paid to UAW and
DLM, and had to accept the return of severely damaged apartments.

3.

Did SHANGRI-LA, by settling the matter and dismissing its appeal prior to
determination of said appeal, forfeit its right to pursue a malpractice action against
Turner.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESENTATION
1.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment the facts are reviewed in the light most
favorable to the losing party and no deference is given to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and all other
submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Swift Stop Inc. v. Wight,
845 P.2d250, 250 (UtahApp 1992) Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 798 P.2d
73 3, 734 (Utah 1990) Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d
613, 615 (Utah 1982)
This issue was preserved below and was raised in SHANGRI-LA's memorandum
opposition to Turner's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 80, 86, 87 )

2.

Proximate cause is an issue of fact and only if there is no evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate. Swift
Stop, Inc. v. Wight. Id
This issue was preserved below. (Affidavit of Stanley Wade, and SHANGRI- LA's
memorandum in opposition to Turner's motion for summary judgment.
R. at 76-78, 87, 89-91)

3.

The question of whether SHANGRI-LA's action of settlement of its suit with
UAW and DLM prior to determination of appeal constituted a waiver of its right to
pursue a malpractice action against Turner is a question of law, in a review of

which the appellate court will afford the trial court's decision no deference but
will review it for correctness. See Onglntl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave Corp., 850
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993)
The issue was preserved below in that it was the primary issue argued in Turner's
motion for summary judgment and the trial court specifically found that
SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a malpractice action against Turner
in the Order Granting Summary Judgment. (R. at 35 -39, 80 -87 )
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
1.

Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ( Set forth in Addendum 1 )

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (1996) ( Set forth in Addendum

2

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

SHANGRI-LA retained Turner to represent its interest in the matter involved in
the sheriffs sale of the apartment complex known as Shangri-la Garden
Apartments, ultimately, to UAW and DLM. Turner appeared as counsel on
January 28, 1998. SHANGRI-LA had earlier been involved in small claims court
actions that ultimately resulted in judgment against SHANGRI-LA for costs and
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,767.00. The amount was not paid, the property
was set for sheriffs sale and after a botched attempt to pay the amount due prior to
sale, was sold for $8,000.00 to Kasey Enterprises, Inc, on August 27, 1996. UAW
and DLM purchased the; interest of Kasey Enterprises, Inc. for $11,000.00.
6

SHANGRI-LA did not redeem the property within the 6 month redemption period
set forth in Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. UAW and DLM served a
notice to quit on April 16, 1997 and on April 18, 1997, SHANGRI-LA filed an
action in Third District Court seeking quiet title to the property and an order
setting aside the sheriffs sale or in the alternative, an order extending the time for
redemption. UAW and DLM counterclaimed for unlawful detainer and conversion.
A two day trial was held on April 13 and 14, 1999.
The trial court entered its memorandum decision on May 5, 1998 in which it
extended the redemption period, determined that UAW and DLM were entitled to
return of their purchase price plus attorney's fees and taxes paid on the property
along with rents received on the property from the time of purchase until time of
trial, an amount of $304,333.00. The trial court felt that the matter of treble
damages had not been sufficiently briefed, and requested the parties to brief the
question of treble damages. After receiving said briefs, the trial court imposed a
redemption fee including rents of $304,333.00 trebled to the amount of
$912,999.00. (See Addendum 3 )
Turner filed a brief in response to the trial courts request therefore, in which he for
the first time, argued that the provisions of the unlawful detainer act did not apply.
He did not argue the redemption fee limitations of Rule 69(j), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure would limit the amount of redemption fee that could be legitimately
imposed. (See Addendum 4 )
7

SHANGRI-LA timely filed its notice of appeal in the matter on November, 17,
1998. The appeal progressed to the point of appellant filing its brief on appeal and
appellee filing its brief on appeal, having been completed on or about March 24,
2000. (See Addendum

5 )

During the time UAW and DLM had possession of the property, the properly was
neglected and by reason of lax screening, the quality of tenants declined leading to
more frequent non-payment of rents. There was a fire in one of the apartment
buildings, resulting in substantial damage, which was repaired only to the extent of
closing holes in the roof to keep water out, the property was not repaired to the
state of being habitable for new tenants. Money from the coin operated machines
on the premises was collected but not used to pay obligations, resulting in liens
being filed against the property. Proper maintenance was not being done. Damage
was not timely repaired. All of the foregoing, resulted in diminution of value of the
property. (Affidavit of Stanley Wade Addendum 6 )
By reason of the aforestated problems, SHANGRI-LA made a business decision to
settle the matter with UAW and DLM in order to be able to re-take possession of
the property and to be able to resolve the problems outlined above and reverse the
ongoing diminution in value of the property attributable to the flawed management
of said property. The matter was settled on or about October 6, 2000 by a
settlement agreement that provided, inter alia for the dismissal with prejudice of
the appeal. On October 6, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court granted a voluntary
8

dismissal of appeal with prejudice, based on the stipulation of the parties therefore.
(See Addendum

6 )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court found there were no contested issues of fact in this matter, allowing
it to rule as a matter of law that there was no malpractice committed by Turner. Prior to
and at trial, Turner did not bring to the court's attention, the provisions of Rule 69 (j)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which rule states with specificity in subparagraphs (3) and
(7) what cost items shall be assessed in calculating a redemption fee and how any rents
are to be treated. Neither did he bring to the court's attention and argue in an effective
and timely manner the language of the unlawful detainer statute that limits the application
of such statute to tenant and landlord disputes. The dispute involved in that matter was a
title dispute, which was not brought to the court's attention. An attorney's conduct with
regard to whether or not he meets the required standard of care, is a question of fact. It is
the duty of a competent attorney to bring pertinent and relevant law to the courts
attention. Failure to do so is malpractice. Turner's failure to meet the required standard of
care was the proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA's being assessed a redemption fee of
nearly one million dollars and being placed in the position of having to settle with UAW
and DLM, to mitigate its damages, and to its detriment. Proximate cause is a question of
fact. The lower court's finding that SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a
malpractice action against Turner when it settled the matter before determination of the
appeal taken fro Judge Noel's ruling was error. Where its counsel's deficient conduct
9

places a party in the position of having to settle a matter before final determination of an
appeal, to minimize its losses, that party is not compelled to forgo its right to seek redress
for malpractice.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE WERE NO
CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT RELATING TO THE QUESTION
OF ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE.

An attorney has a duty to use such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the
tasks which they undertake. Williams b. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Lucase v. Hamm, 56 Cal2d 583, 15 Car.Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961) cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S.Ct. 603, 7 L.Ed.2d 525 (1962) In the underlying case, there
were two critical issues raised by the pleadings. First, SHANGRI-LA raised, inter alia,
the issue of equitable redemption of the property. Redemption is governed by Rule 69 (j),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (1), (2), (4), (5) and(6) set forth who may
redeem, how redemption is made, subsequent redemptions, notice of redemption and
certificate of redemption or conveyance. As regards this case, the two critical provisions
relating to redemptions are subparagraphs (3) and (7). Subparagraph (3), in pertinent part
states:
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be redeemed . .
. . .by paying the amount of the purchase with a surcharge of 6 percent thereon
in addition, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any
10

reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of
any improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid thereon
after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on such other amounts, . ..
Subparagraph (7) says, in pertinent part
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the time of sale until
a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of redemption until another
redemption, is entitled to receive from any tenant in possession the rents of the
property sold or the value of the use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or
profits have been received by the judgment creditor or purchaser, or their assigns,
from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents
and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid . . .
The above provisions therefore then state that in a redemption situation, such as the one
at bar, the amount to be paid by the redemptioner, should have been the amount paid by
the purchaser at purchase of the property, in this case, $11,000.00 plus 6 percent, plus
any amount paid for taxes by the purchaser, plus any amount paid for fire insurance and
necessaiy maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvement on the property, plus
interest at the lawful rate on any amount paid for the last five items. (The record is silent
as to whether UAW and DLM paid any amount other than the purchase price of
$11,000.00) A redemption fee calculated according to the requirements of the rule, would
have been less than $20,000.00 - far shy of the nearly one million dollars imposed by the
court. Any rents involved should have only been used to pay the appropriate redemption
fee, any excess to go to the property owner, or redemptioner. The trial court was never
presented with the application and language of Rule 69 (j) by SHANGRI-LA's counsel. If
the provisions of said rule had been presented in a timely manner at trial, it is difficult to
see how the trial court could have ignored the rule's provisions to reach the ruling it did.
11

It is elemental that a lawyer, using such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise is or becomes aware of
provisions of the law that so obviously apply to his case. SHANGRI-LA as part of its suit
was seeking the right to redeem the property. One seeking redemption as a remedy should
certainly know and argue the law that governs such remedy. This omission was clearly a
breach of the required standard of care. " . . . whether a defendant has breached the
required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." Harline v. Barker 854 P.2d
595, 599 (Utah App. 1993)
The second issue of importance relates to the claim by UAW and DLM, to be
entitled to relief for unlawful detainer, Utah Code Ann. 1996, § 78-36-3. Unlawful
detainer by tenant for term less than life. (Emphasis added) The language of the statute
states in its first paragraph: "(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is
guilty of an unlawful detainer: . . ." (Emphasis added) The statute clearly on its face
applies only to landlord - tenant disputes. The cases annotated under the statute clearly
apply only to 'tenants'. The dispute between UAW and DLM and SHANGRI-LA was a
dispute over TITLE to real property, not a dispute over tenancy. The application of the
statute was not contested by SHANGRI-LA's counsel until after the court had made its
decision wherein it granted UAW and DLM damage relief under the statute. (See the trial
courts memorandum decision, Addendum 3 ) The court only wanted additional briefing
from the parties on whether to treble such damages or not. The court obviously had

decided to bestow on UAW and DLM the benefit of the unlawful detainer statute. This
too, constitutes a breach of the standard of care and is a question of fact for the jury to
decide.
2.

Turner's conduct constituted malpractice, and such malpractice was the
proximate cause of SHANGRI-LA being burdened with a redemption
fee of nearly one million dollars, losing possession of the apartment
complex and being placed in the position of being forced to mitigate its
damages by settling, to its detriment, with UAW and DLM. Causation is
a question of fact for the jury to decide.

SHANGRI-LA has alleged itself to have been damaged by Turner's failure to meet
the required standard of care of an attorney, thus raising the issue of causation. If Turner
had brought the law with regard to the redemption fee and the law regarding unlawful
detainer to the courts attention in a timely manner, the court would have knowingly had
to rule contrary to the law to rule as it did. Turner did not do so, and the court's ruling
was extremely prejudicial to SHANGRI-LA. Turner's failure to meet the standard of care
caused the detriment to SHANGRI-LA. "Proximate cause is an issue of fact. . .Thus, only
if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary
judgment appropriate. Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight 845 P. 2d 250, 253 (UtahApp. 1992)
"The client must show that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of
professional competence and had done the act he failed to do or not done the act
complained about, the client would have benefited." Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332,
437 P.2d 686, 690 (1968) Again, such a showing relies on the facts, the facts regarding
the issue are contested and therefore not appropriate for summary disposition.

13

3,

Under the facts of this case, it was error for the trial court to find
that SHANGRI-LA had forfeited its right to pursue a malpractice
action against Turner.

There appear to be no Utah cases that address this issue. However, there are cases
from other jurisdictions which have considered the question of when and how a party can
forfeit a right to pursue counsel for malpractice. Turner, in his motion to the trial court
and addressing the situation where a parties counsel had acted in such a manner as to give
the party a claim to having been damaged by malpractice, cited Legal Malpractice §21.16
(5th Ed. 2000), Mallen and Smith in its statement: "if the compromise prevented the
judicial lesolution of issues that would have established that the attorney was not
negligent or a cause of the client's loss, then the attorney should not be liable." They
went on to cite two Florida cases, Segal v. Segall, 632 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) and
Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association v. Sikes, 590 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. Ct. App.
1991) as precedent Both Sikes and Segal involved fact situations in which the attorneys
who were sued for malpractice, committed no negligence in their conduct at trial, yet the
courts rulings were adverse to their client's interests. In each case, there was a substantial
question of judicial error, which was not caused by the attorney's conduct. In each case,
the clients appealed the result and then settled the cases before the appeals were heard
and then sued their respective attorneys for malpractice. Their settlement of the cases
before ruling on the appeals thereby prevented the appellate court from reversing the trial
court's error, and vindicating their attorneys actions at trial. The appellate courts in the
malpractice actions ruled in both cases that by settling the underlying cases before
14

appellate determination, the clients had abandoned or waived their claims against their
attorneys. The distinction between the Florida cases and the instant case is that in this
matter, there was substantial negligent conduct by Turner which allowed the trial court to
decide against SHANGRI-LA on the issues of damage and unlawful detainer. The result
being that the trial court ruled, in error, that the Wrongful Detainer Act applied to the
underlying case and to err in failing to applythe provisions of Rule 69 (j) (3) and (7),
provisions of which limit the cost items to be included in the redemption fee and specify
how rents are to be treated if they were included in the scenario. Of interest is the Court's
final comment in Segal,: "We are unable to establish a bright-line rule that complete
appellate review of the underlying litigation is a condition precedent to every legal
malpractice action. To do so would, in many cases, violate the tenet that the law will not
require the performance of useless acts."
UAW and DLM claimed relief under the Wrongful Detainer Act and asked for an
award of compensation that was not provided for in Rule 69 (j) (3) and (7) early on in
their case and Turner did not object to the claim for relief under wrongful detainer until
after the trial court entered its memorandum decision, and never did argue the limitations
of Rule 69 At final argument, the following dialogue took place:
The Court:

(Addressing Mr. Turner) — l e t me ask you this question. Even if I
were to allow you to redeem, if I were to accept your equitable
redemption argument, defendant's claim that they're still entitled to
rents of $304,000 since the unlawful detainer. What is your response
15

to that?

Mr. Turner: Our answer would be, your Honor, that they would be entitled to
rents from the period they filed the unlawful detainer until such time
as this action was brought.

( R. at 98 )

Mr. Turner did not dispute the claim of UAW and DLM to the rents, treble damages, and
attorney's fees, until after the case had been tried, the parties had given their final
argument and rested.
Turner has cited the case of Sutherlandv. Milstein, 266A.D.2d33, 608 N.YS.2.d
15; (1999 N. Y. App. Div) which case involved a fact situation in which defendant
attorneys represented plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action which was settled. The
plaintiffs sued their attorneys for malpractice. The appellate court dismissed the appeal
finding that the adult plaintiffs claim was time barred and the second plaintiffs claim
survived by reason of infancy toll but was properly dismissed because the adult plaintiff
controlled the settlement. The court noted that plaintiff did not allege their attorney's
negligence forced them to settle. In the instant case, the defendant's negligence did force
plaintiff to settle with UAW and DLM to avoid ongoing and accelerating damage.
Likewise, the case of Cozza v. Steuer 694 N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio App. 8 Dist 1997) is cited
as authority to preclude suit where the underlying case is settled prior to determination on
appeal. The facts are somewhat complicated, but basically involve an employer hiring
attorneys to resist an age discrimination suit by an employee. The employee prevailed,
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the employer appealed, settled before the appeal was heard and sued its attorneys for
malpractice. The Steuer court dismissed the legal malpractice action but in doing so
stated:
We do not suggest that a settlement of the underlying action always operates as a
waiver of a client's malpractice claim against his attorney. A settlement entered
into as a result of an attorney's exercise of reasonable judgment in handling a case
bars a malpractice claim against the attorney. DePugh v. Sladjoe (1996) 111 Ohio
App.3d675, 676N.E.2d 1231. However, a legal malpractice claim is not barred
when the attorney has acted unreasonably or has committed malpractice per
se. Id "[W]hen an attorney has made an obvious error which seriously
compromises his client's claim, and a settlement is on the table * * * the client
should not be forced to forgo the settlement offer as a condition of pursuing the
attorney for malpractice. (Emphasis added) Id. See, also, Monastra v. D 'Amore
(1996) 111 Ohio App. 3d 296, 676N.E.2d 132 (where attorney's defective
representation diminishes client's ability to reach a successful settlement or to
succeed at trial, the settlement of the action should not imply a waiver of client's
right to file legal malpractice action against the attorney).
Mr. Turner's failure to contest critical issues prior to and at trial created the scenario that
placed Plaintiffs in a no-win situation.
For a plaintiff to prevail in a legal malpractice action, it must prove five elements:
"(i) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client
arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection
between the breach of the duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) actual
damages." Harline v. Barker 912 P. 2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996), as cited in Glencore, LTD.
v. Ince 972 P.2d 376 (Utah 1998). The Ince Court goes on to note that a malpractice
action presents a "case within a case". The objective is to establish what the result [of the
underlying litigation] should have been, (an objective standard), not what a particular
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judge or jury would have decided (a subjective standard.) The court takes this language,
(paraphrased, above) from 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffery M. Smith, legal malpractice
§27.7 at 641-42 (3d ed 1989) SHANGRI-LA asserts the position that in light of the above
statement of law, it is also appropriate to establish what the result of underlying litigation
should have been and not what the trial judge erroneously did decide, (i.) There can be no
doubt that there was an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants,
(ii.) From the attorney-client relationship arise several duties, one of which is set forth in
Rule 1.1 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct which requires: "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." (iii.) The demonstrated unfamiliarity with and failure to timely raise the
inapplicability of the Unlawful Detainer Statute and the appropriate provisions of Rule 69
(j) (3) and (7) constitute a breach of the afore stated duty and suggest that the Defendants
were negligent in failing to undertake reasonable legal research about the issue, (iv.) The
breach of that duty placed the SHANGRI-LA in a no-win situation where IT was forced
either endure the ongoing damage and diminution in value to the apartment complex
under the despotic stewardship of UAW and DLM until their appeal was heard and
decided, which could have been two or more years down the road, or to settle the matter
with UAW and DLM to cut off the damage and diminution in value to the property.
(v.)The Plaintiffs were damaged by having to pay $100,000 to UAW and DLM, abandon
the fire insurance proceeds, loose the rent paid to UAW and DLM, and to accept the
18

return of severely damaged apartments that required much repair.
The case of Watkis & Saperstein v. Williams 931 P.2d840 (Utah 1996) is
applicable. That case involved allegations of negligence where Watkiss & Saperstein
were alleged to have committed negligence in a case where they missed a statute of
limitations. However, the law in the District of Columbia was unsettled and uncertain as
it regarded the event tolling a statute of limitations in their particular situation. Watkiss &
Saperstein chose the wrong date as determined by an appellate court decision handed
down after the fact resulting in their client being out of court on the issue. In ruling on
their case in the malpractice action brought as a result thereof, the Utah Supreme Court
noted, inter alia, that "To qualify for immunity from liability for the consequences of an
eiToneous legal interpretation of unsettled and uncertain law, most courts demand that
lawyers perform the research and investigation necessary to make an informed judgment.
See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis 13Cal.3d349, 118 CalRptr 621, 530 P.2d589 (1975). This is so
the lawyer will follow the best and most logical interpretation out of a number of
reasonable interpretations. SeeMallen & Smith § 17.6 at 507-08, § 17.17, at 543." Noting
that a lawyer is not required to anticipate changes in the law, the Supreme Court affirmed
the trial courts dismissal of the action against Watkiss & Saperstein. The whole point of
citing this case and the holdings thereof, is to highlight the obligation of counsel to know
the law involved in the issues of a case he undertakes, and if he does not know the law,
then he is obligated to learn the law, and to do so before trial on the matter. Otherwise he
does not fulfill his duty of competent representation to the client he represents.
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Once an attorney-client relationship is established, the attorney's duty is to "'use
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess and exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake/" Williams v.
Barber, 765 P. 2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988). The Williams Court also states that". . . counsel
is required to undertake the research which a reasonable attorney under the circumstances
would do. Id. Accord Williams, 765 P. 2d at 889. " Ordinarily, whether a defendant has
breached the required standards of care is a question of fact for the jury. Consequently, a
motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a genuine
issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would entitle
him to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of
the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct
measures up to the required standard." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 2d 613, 615 ( Utah
1982).
CONCLUSION
Turner owed a duty to the client to not undertake representation regarding an area
of the law in which he did not have the such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks
which they undertake. Lucas v. Hamm 56 Cal.2d583f 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P. 2d
685, 689 (1961) cert. Denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S.Ct. 603, 7L.Ed2d525 (1962). It has
been recognized that a lawyer may undertake a case involving issues of law in which he
is not cognizant or knowledgeable, if he is able to develop the cognizance or knowledge
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in time to meet his duty to the client. The Defendants failure to be able to meet and deal
with the issue of the Wrongful Detainer Statute and the elements of Rule 69 (j) (3) and
(7) at trial constitutes a breach of that duty. But for Turner's failure to meet the correct
standard of care, SHANGRI-LA would not have been placed in a position where it was
forced to settle with UAW and DLM prior to the hearing of its appeal, to mitigate its
damages and prevent further damage and diminution of value of the apartment complex.
Most of the foregoing issues are questions of fact. The cases cited by Turner which were
found to defeat a malpractice claim by the client against his attorney, were cases in which
the attorney's conduct was not questionable, but the result was. They did not involve
cases in which the attorney missed or failed to address critical issues, which proximately
caused the client's injury and damage. There are disputed issues of material fact in this
matter that preclude summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment should be
reversed.
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Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto.
(a) Availability of writ of execution. A writ of execution is available to a
judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or otber order requiring the delivery
of property or the payment of money by a judgment debtor.
(b) Property subject to execution. A writ of execution may be used to
levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal property and real property
which is not exempt from execution under state or federal law.
(c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless otherwise ordered by the court,
a writ of execution may be issued at any time within eight years following the
entry of a judgment or order (except an execution may be stayed pursuant to
Rule 62), either in the county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any
county in which a transcript thereof has been filed and docketed in the office
of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstanding the death of a party after
judgment, execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as follows:
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of
an authorized executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien
thereon.
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execution shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah, and subscribed by the
clerk of the court. It shall be issued to the sheriff or constable of any county in
the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) but where
it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it shall be issued
to the sheriff of the county where the real property or some part thereof is
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal property, it
may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the court, the docket number, the county where the same is entered or
docketed, the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for the payment
of money, the amount thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. The writ
may be accompanied by a praecipe executed by the judgment creditor or the
judgment creditor's counsel generally or specifically describing the real or
personal property to be levied upon. It shall be directed to the sheriff of the
county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real property, and shall
require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms of the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment debtor generally it may direct the sheriff or constable to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the non-exempt personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient
non-exempt personal property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy
the judgment, with interest, out of the judgment debtor's non-exempt real
property.
(e) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be served at
any time within sixty days after its receipt by the officer. It shall then be
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the clerk
must attach it to the record.
(f) Service of the writ Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer
must execute the writ against the non-exempt property of the judgment
debtor by levying on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient
property; collecting or selling the choses in action and selling the other property in the manner set forth herein. Levy includes the seizure of the property
and holding the property in person or through one or more agents, including
the judgment debtor, appointed by the officer. When there is more property of
the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing
costs within view of the officer, the officer must levy only on such part of the
property as the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is
amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs.
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When an officer has served an execution issued out of any court the officer
may complete the return thereof after such date of service.
(g) Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt property and
right to a hearing. At the time the writ of execution is issued, the clerk shall
attach to the writ a notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing
and two copies of an application by which the judgment debtor may request a
hearing.
Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable shall serve upon the judgment debtor, in the same manner as service of a summons in a civil action, or
cause to be transmitted by both regular and certified mail, returned receipt
requested, to the judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the
judgment creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a
hearing, and (ii) the application by which the judgment debtor may request a
hearing. Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the
date of sale or delivery and serve upon the judgment debtor notice of the date
and time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of the notice of
execution and exemptions and right to a hearing.
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served upon the judgment debtor shall indicate in substance that certain property is or may be
exempt from execution including but not limited to a homestead; tools of the
trade; a motor vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession;
social security benefits; supplemental security income benefits; veterans' benefits; unemployment benefits; workers' compensation benefits; public assistance (welfare); alimony; child support; certain pensions; part or all of wages
or other earnings from personal services; certain furnishings and appliances;
musical instruments; and heirlooms (each not to exceed the amount allowed
by law). The notice shall also indicate that the list is a partial list and other
various property exemptions may be available under federal law or the Utah
exemptions statute, and that the judgment debtor must request a hearing
within ten (10) days from the date of service of the notice upon the judgment
debtor. For purposes of this provision, the date of service shall be the date of
mailing, if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no period for
mailing under Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period.
If the writ, the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing
cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the same manner as service of a
summons in a civil action, and the judgment creditor does not have available
the judgment debtor's last known address, only the following notice need be
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of general circulation
in each county in which the property levied upon, or some part thereof, is
situated:
TO
, Judgment Debtor:
A writ of execution has been issued in the above-captioned case, directed to the sheriff or constable of
County, commanding the sheriff or constable as follows:
"WHEREAS,
[Quoting body of writ of execution]."
YOU MAY HAVE A RIGHT TO EXEMPT PROPERTY from the sale
under statutes of the United States or this state, including Utah Code
Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 23, in the manner described in those statutes.
The date of publication shall be deemed the date of service and the date of
publication shall be not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale or
delivery.
This paragraph (g) shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure
proceedings commenced under Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37.
(h) Request for hearing.
/..N m . — j?
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owns or claims an interest in the property subject to execution may request a hearing to claim any exemption to the execution, or to challenge
the issuance of the writ Such request must be filed or served upon the
judgment creditor or the attorney for the judgment creditor within ten
(10) days of the service upon the judgment debtor of the materials required to be served by paragraph (g) upon the judgment debtor. The
request for a hearing, which shall be provided to the judgment debtor
shall be in a form to enable the judgment debtor to specify the grounds
upon which the judgment debtor challenges the issuance of the writ or
claims the property executed upon to be exempt, in whole or in part.
(2) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing is filed
by or on behalf of the judgment debtor, the court shall set the matter for
hearing within ten (10) days from the filing of the request and serve
notice of that hearing upon all parties by first class mail. If the court
determines at the hearing that the writ was issued improperly, or that
any property seized is exempt from or is not subject to execution, the court
shall immediately issue an order to the officer releasing such property or
portion thereof from the writ of execution. If the court finds that the
property or a portion thereof is subject to execution and not exempt, it
shall issue an order directing the officer to proceed with the sale of the
non-exempt property subject to execution. If the originally scheduled date
of sale for which notice has been given has passed, notice of the new date
and time of sale shall be provided as required herein. No sale may be held
until the Court has decided upon the issues presented at the hearing. At
the hearing, the court may award costs as it deems appropriate.
(3) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing is not
filed as provided for in this Rule and the time for doing so has expired,
then the officer shall proceed to sell or deliver the property subject to
execution in accordance with the writ and this Rule 69.
(4) This paragraph (h) shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure proceedings commenced under Utah Code Annotated, Title 78,
Chapter 37.
(i) Proceedings on sale of property.
(1) Notice of sale. Before the sale of the property on execution notice
thereof must be given as follows: (A) in case of perishable property or
animals, by posting written notice of the time and place of sale, and
generally describing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and
in at least three other public places of the county or city where the sale is
to take place, for such a time as may be reasonable, considering the
character and condition of the property; (B) in case of other personal
property, by posting written notice of the time and place of sale, and
generally describing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and
in at least three public places of the county or city where the sale is to
take place, for not less than seven nor more than 14 days, and by publishing a copy thereof at least one time not less than one day preceding the
sale in some newspaper of general circulation published or circulated in
the county where the sale is to take place, if there is one; (C) in case of
real property, by posting written notice of the time and place of sale, and
particularly describing the property, for 21 days, on the property to be
sold, at the place of sale, at the district courthouse of the county where the
real property to be sold is situated, and in at least three public places of
the county or city where the sale is to take place, and by publishing a copy
thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive weeks immediately
preceding the sale, in some newspaper of general circulation published or
circulated in the county, if there is one. In addition, except for the sale of
perishable property or animals, if notice of the date and time of sale has
not been served upon the judgment debtor previously, notice of the date
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and time of sale shall be served upon the judgment debtor personally or
by causing the same to be transmitted by regular or certified mail to the
judgment debtor's last known address.
(2) Postponement If at the time and place appointed for the sale of
any real or personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for
want of purchasers, or other sufficient cause, the officer may postpone the
same from time to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every
such case the officer shall make public declaration thereof at the time and
place previously appointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a
longer time than 72 hours, notice thereof shall be given in the same
manner as the original notice of such sale is required to be given.
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be
made at auction to the highest bidder, Monday through Saturday, legal
holidays excluded, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m.
After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution no more
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution nor such officer's
deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase at such
sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual delivery it
must be within view of those who attend the sale. The sale must be held
in a place reasonably accessible to the general public. The property must
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels,
they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is
claimed by a third person, and the third person requires it to be sold
separately, such portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must
be made at the courthouse of the county in which the property, or some
part thereof, is situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may
also direct the order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold,
when such property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles
which can be sold to advantage separately, and the officer 'must follow
such directions. The officer shall pay to the judgment creditor or the
attorney for the judgment creditor so much of the sales proceeds as will
satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and
reasonable accrued costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless
otherwise directed by the judgment or the court.
(4) Accounting of sale. Upon request of the judgment debtor or the
judgment debtor's attorney, the plaintiff shall deliver an accounting of
any execution sale, including the amount due on the judgment, accrued
costs, and the amount realized at the sale.
(5) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid for the
property struck off to such purchaser at a sale under execution, the officer
may again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any
loss is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being
liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished
accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in
such officer's discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person.
(6) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property
pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the
property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery)
and shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale and
payment. Such certificate shall state that all right, title and interest
which the debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or
attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is
transferred to the purchaser.
(7) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give
to the uurchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (A) a particular descrip-
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tion of the real property sold; (B) the price paid by the purchaser for each
lot or parcel if sold separately; (C) the whole price paid; (D) a statement to
the effect that all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in
and to the property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate shall be filed for record by the officer in the office
of the recorder of the county. The real property sold shall be subject to
redemption, except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a twoyears' unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute,
(j) Redemption of real property from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to redemption, or
any part sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or
their successors in interest: (A) the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having
a lien by judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on
some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was
sold.
(2) Redemption; how made. The person seeking redemption may
make payment of the amount required to the person from whom the
property is being redeemed, or for such person to the officer who made the
sale, or such officer's successor in office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom the redemptioner
seeks to redeem, and serve with the notice to the officer; (A) a certified
copy of the judgment under which the redemptioner claims the right to
redeem, or, if the redemptioner redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a
copy certified by the recorder; (B) an assignment, properly acknowledged
or proved where the same is necessary to establish the claim; (C) an
affidavit by the redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the amount
then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other lien.
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be
redeemed within six months after the sale by paying the amount of the
purchase with a surcharge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with
the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fireinsurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property,which the purchaser may have paid thereon
after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on such other
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that
of the person seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which
said purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was
issued, and at the same time file with the court and serve upon the
purchaser a petition setting forth the item or items demanded to which
the redemptioner objects, together with the grounds of objection; and
thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of such
objections. A copy of the order fixing time for hearing shall be served on
the purchaser not less than five days before the day of hearing. Upon the
hearing of the petition the court shall enter an order determining the
amount required for redemption. In the event an additional amount to
that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The
purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemption.
(4) Subsequent redemptions* If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days
after the last redemption and within six months aft^r thp «mlp T*ACU*™ fVn*

249

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 69

property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in
the preceding paragraph, upon paying the sum of such last redemption,
with a surcharge of three percent thereon in addition, and the amount of
any assessment or tax, and any reasonable stun for fire insurance and
necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the
property which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such
last redemptioner prior to the redemptioner^ own, with interest.
(5) Notice of redemption. Written notice of any redemption shall be
given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of the county.
Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or any sums for
fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or the
amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the redemption was
made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other liens.
(6) Certificate of redemption or conveyance. If no redemption is
made within six months after the sale, the purchaser or the purchaser's
assignee is entitled to a conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever 60 days
have elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor has been made and
notice thereof has been given, the last redemptioner, or assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the
judgment debtor redeems, the judgment debtor must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by a creditor. If the debtor
redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and the debtor is restored to
the debtor's estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the person to whom
the payment is made must execute and deliver to the debtor a certificate
of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed and
recorded in the office of the county recorder where the property is situated.
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from any tenant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or their assigns, from the property
thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents and
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or their assigns, a written and verified statement of the amoxmts of
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is extended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or
such purchaser's assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or such purchaser's assigns shall for a period of one month from
and after such demand, fail or refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within 60 days after such demand, bring an
action to compel an accounting and disclosure of such rents and profits,
and until 15 days from and after the final determination of such action
the right of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or debtor.
(k) Remedies of purchaser.
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property,
upon motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or such purchaser's
successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the
property at the time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during
the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it was Dreviously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of
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husbandry, or to make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to
use wood or timber on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or
for fuel for a family while such person occupies the property. After the
estate has become absolute, the purchaser or a successor in interest may
maintain an action to recover damages for iiyury to the properly by the
tenant or other person in possession after sale and before possession is
delivered under the conveyance.
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, or a
successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed thereof
or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as the
court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor for
the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative,
if such purchaser or a successor in interest, fails to recover possession of
any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because
the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court having
jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to
the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by such purchaser
at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment at the same
rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment so revived shall
have the same force and effect as would an original judgment of the date
of the revival.
0) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them
pays, without a sale, more than such person's proportion, and the right of
contribution exists, such person may compel such contribution from the
others; and where a judgment against several is upon an obligation of one or
more as security for the others, and the surety has paid the amount or any
part thereof, by sale of property or otherwise, the surety may require reimbursement from the principal. The person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month after payment, or sale of the property in
the event there is a sale, file in the court where the judgment was rendered a
notice of such payment and the claim for contribution or reimbursement.
Upon the filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry thereof in the
margin of the docket which shall have the effect of a judgment against the
other judgment debtors to the extent of their liability for contribution or
reimbursement.
(m) Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment
debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person
indebted to the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of the debt,
or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the
officer's receipt is a sufficient discharge for the amount paid.
(n) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person
other than the defendant, or should the officer be requested by the judgment
creditor so to do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an
undertaking, with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages
that the officer may sustain by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such undertaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed
against such property.
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(o) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest At any time
when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution
might issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or
without notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court,
a master, or other person appointed by the court, at a specified time and place
to answer concerning the judgment debtor's property. A judgment debtor, or if
a corporation, any officer thereof, may be required to attend outside the
county in which such person resides, but the court may make such order as to
mileage and expenses as is just The order may also restrain the judgment
debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. Upon
the hearing such proceedings may be had for the application of the property of
the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the judgment as on execution
against such property.
(p) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such
judgment debtor or is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding
two hundred fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, the court may order
such person or corporation or any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the
court or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning the same.
Witness fees and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court
(q) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person or
corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted
to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from
execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor
or denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon
such terms as may be just.
(r) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any
proceedings brought under this rule in the same manner as upon the trial of
an issue.
(s) Order for property to be applied on judgment The court or master
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the possession of the judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the
judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
(t) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its
further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the appointment
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated.
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1994
amendments constitute a substantial reorganization and revision of the rule applicable to
executions. While not an exhaustive list, the
Advisory Committee notes the following significant changes:
The Rule has been restructured to eliminate
references to gender.
Paragraph (a) specifies that a writ of execution is available only post judgment and Paragraph (b) now states that a writ of execution
may only be used to reach the judgment
debtor's non-exempt real or personal property.
The availability of writs of execution to reach

non-exempt properly, and the requirement
that the judgment creditor now notify the judgment debtor of a right to exemptions, are described in several provisions of the revised
rule. This change incorporates similar notice
procedures now utilized in Rule 64D, and alleviates constitutional due process problems in
the previous rule. These constitutional issues
were addressed by the United States Court of
Appeals in Aacen v. San Juan County Sheriffs
Department, 944 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991), involving a similar New Mexico Rule.
Paragraph (d) retains the requirement that
writs of execution be issued to aind served by a
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sheriff or constable. A sheriff must make ser- county or city where the sale is to take place,
vice in the case of real property. Paragraph (d) and it must be published in a newspaper of
also allows the use of a praecipe, which is com- general circulation at least one day preceding
monly executed by the judgment creditor or the the sale. In addition, in the event notice of the
judgment creditor's counsel directing the offi- time and place of sale has not been previously
cer to specific property to be levied upon. In served upon or mailed to the judgment debtor,
practice, some officers will not execute a writ of or if the original sale date was canceled, this
execution without an accompanying praecipe. Paragraph requires that a copy of the notice of
Paragraph (e) has been amended to allow the sale be served upon or mailed to the judgment
officer to serve the writ within sixty (60) days, debtor. The former rule simply required postalthough the return of the writ may be made ing in three public places. The Committee dethereafter.
termined that such notice would not reasonParagraph (f) now defines "levy" as the sei- ably apprise the judgment debtor or interested
zure of the non-exempt property and autho- third parties of the time and place of sale.
rizes the officer to hold the property in person Those interested in the sale will also be able to
or through one or more agents. It is common review all notices at a central location, Le., the
practice for the officer to appoint a "keeper" to district courthouse. Similar changes have been
hold the property pending sale as it is not al- made with respect to notice of sale of real propways practical for the officer to take physical erty. The Committee believes that the revipossession of the property. Language in this sionstothis paragraph rectify several constituparagraph on payment of the sales proceeds tional issues raised by the former Rule.
has now been relocated to new Paragraph (i) on
Paragraph (iX2) expands the time in which
conducting the sale. Provisions in paragraph
(f) regarding detailed procedures in event of the officer may postpone the salefromone day
death of the officer were deemed unnecessary to 72 hours. This coincides with a similar postponement procedure in the Utah Trust Deed
and have been eliminated.
Paragraph (g) is new and provides that the Foreclosure statute.
Paragraph (iX3) clarifies the authorized days
clerk shall attach to the writ of execution a
notice of execution and exemptions and right to for a sale and expands the time allowed from
a hearing, and two copies of an application by 9:00 o'clock a.m. to 8:00 o'clock pjn., rather
which the judgment debtor may request a than 5:00 o'clock p jn. This was intended by the
hearing. A similar procedure is contained in Committee to expand the time during which
Rule 64D. It is expected in practice that the the judgment debtor and third parties would be
plaintiff will provide to the clerk the materials able to attend the sale.
Paragraph (j) clarifies that redemption only
to be attached to the writ. Official forms for the
pertains
to real property and clarifies the pronotice of execution, exemptions and right to a
hearing, and the application for a hearing have cedure and documents required for redemption.
Paragraph (o) pertains to orders in supplebeen prepared by the Committee. Service of
these forms may be made personally in the mental proceedings and authorizes the court to
same manner as service of a summons in a civil order the judgment debtor to appear before the
action or may be transmitted by mail to the court, a master or other person appointed by
judgment debtor's last known address as pro- the court. It is intended by the Committee that
vided by the judgment creditor. Notice of the this could include the judgment creditor's attime and date of sale may also be served at the torney. The former rule authorizing the judgsame time. Paragraph (g) also contains a publi- ment debtor to be arrested based upon an afficationformof service if the judgment creditor's davit has been eliminated.
Amendment Notes* — The 1994 amendlast known address is not available. This paragraph also sets forth the language to be in- ment, effective January 1, 1995, rewrote this
cluded in the notice and application to be rule.
served upon or mailed to the judgment debtor.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (c) of this
Paragraph (g) is not applicable to judicial rule was originally taken irom Rule 69(a),
mortgage foreclosure proceedings since the F.R.C.P.
real property in such an action has already
Crosa-References. — Contempt, Title 78,
been ordered sold by the court.
Chapter 32.
Paragraph (h) is new. This paragraph conContribution among joint tort-feasors,
tains a hearing procedure similar to current S§ 78-27-39 to 78-27-43.
hearing practice under Rule 64D and contains
County recorder, Title 17, Chapter 21.
the time limits applicable to requests for a
Duty to answer questions, § 78-24-9.
hearing to contest the writ of execution. This
Entry of a judgment after the death of a
paragraph is not applicable to mortgage fore- party, U.R.C.P. 58A(e).
closure proceedings.
Execution and levy against decedent or perParagraph (i)(l) substantially revises the sonal representative prohibited, § 75-3-812.
previous provision on notice of sale. In the case
Fee, additional filing fee for cases where exeof non-perishable personal property, the notice cution requested, i 21-1-5.
must generally describe the property to be sold,
Notice of execution, Form 31.
the notice must be posted at the district courtProcess in behalf of and against persons not
house and in at least three public places in the parties, U.R.C.P. 71A.

253

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 69

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Contents of writ
—Reissuance
of first writ as second writ
Construction of rule.
A clerk may, under circumstances that manContents of writ
date his issuance of a second writ of execution,
—Reissuance of first writ as second writ.
reissue the first writ by acknowledging his iniContribution and reimbursement
tial signature thereon and using a seal previ—Co-guarantors of installment debt.
ously stamped, and by so doing, he has fulfilled
—Joint owners.
the formalities required by Subdivision (b) that
Enforcement of judgment.
the
writ be issued in the name of the state of
—Method.
Utah, sealed with the court's seal, and sub—Right of prevailing party.
scribed by the clerk. Heath Tecna Corp. v.
Interest acquired by purchaser.
Sound Sys. Intl, 588 P.2d 169 (Utah 1978).
—lien.
Contribution and reimbursement
Issuance of writ.
—Co-guarantors
of installment debt
—Partial assignment of judgment.
Where plaintiff co-guarantor of installment
—Prerequisites.
debt had paid less than half of the outstanding
—Stay.
balance due, his action against his co-guaranBankruptcy.
tors for contribution was premature since the
—Timeliness.
right to contribution depends upon perforTolling.
mance by one of more than his proportionate
Order for appearance of judgment debtor.
share. Gardner v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah
—Issues raised.
1984).
Constitutionality.
—Joint owners.
Proceedings for sale of property.
Under this rule there is no authority for dis—Applicability of rule.
tinguishing between the rights of redemption
—Conduct of sale.
of a judgment lienholder, whose judgment was
Separate parcels.
against only one joint owner, and of a lienSetting aside.
holder whose lien covers the entire ownership.
Time of sale.
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791
—Postponement.
(1957).
From Saturday or day before holiday.
Where decedent had actively participated in
—Procedural requirements.
purchase and furnishing of mobile home to be
Redemption.
used for the mutual benefit of himself and
—Amount to be paid.
"Necessary maintenance, upkeep, or re- plaintiff, and he and plaintiff had discussed
marriage and in fact had resided in the mobile
pair."
home together, trial court was justified in conPayment into court.
cluding that the decedent was the joint purWaste.
chaser of the home, that there was a benefit
—Construction of rule.
given to him at his request, and that conse—Effect.
Restoration of property to same condition. quently he received consideration for becoming
a co-obligor on the purchase contract. Winkel
Waiver of irregularities.
v.
Call, 603 P.2d 808 (Utah 1979).
—How made.
Enforcement of judgment
Defects in tender.
—Method.
Substantial compliance.
A levy of execution is ordinarily the only
—Timeliness.
proper method to enforce a judgment lien, unExtension of time.
less the case involves special circumstances,
Pinal adjudication of rights.
such that execution does not lie, in which case
Strict compliance.
the procedure for enforcement is an equitable
—Who may redeem.
action to foreclose the judgment lien. Belnap v.
Assignee of attorney's lien.
Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978).
Assignee of creditor.
Bankruptcy trustee.
—Right of prevailing party.
Judgment debtor.
Party in whose favor judgment was rendered
Remedies of purchaser.
had a clear right to have it enforced, and if
—Dispossession.
anyone attempted to interfere with that right
Scire facias.
it was also the clear duty of the court, in case a
—Failure to obtain possession.
proper application was made, to enforce the
Modification of judgment.
judgment Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen,
Cited.
48 Utah 214,159 P. 541 (1916); Ketchum Coal
Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah 342,159 P. 737,
Construction of rule.
The procedures for redemption often confer 4 A.L.R. 619 (1916).
substantive rights. Generally, therefore, when Interest acquired by purchaser.
the procedure at issue affects the substantive —Lien.
rights of the parties, the procedure should be
Purchaser of horse trailer at sheriffs sale
followed strictly in order not to interfere with took trailer with constructive notice of vehicle
these rights. Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 lien on it, notwithstanding slight discrepancies
/Tu«v* ioo/n
in the description of the trailer on the title cerANALYSIS
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tificate. Basin Loans, Inc. v. Young, 764 P.2d of block 28, Plat A Manti City Survey" did not
serve to separate an otherwise unified parcel
239 (Utah Ct App. 1988).
into two parcels subject to separate sales under
Issuance of writ
Subdivision (eX3). Commercial Bank v.
—Partial assignment of judgment
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343 (1951).
Partial assignment of a judgment and the
Certified copy of a certificate of sale conexecution sale held thereunder were valid tained in a supplemental record was sufficient,
where the judgment debtor had not paid any on appeal, to support trial court's determinaportion of the sizeable judgment against him tion that a parcel of real estate was sold sepaand had not been subjected to collection efforts rately where the record contained conflicting
by the original judgment creditor; any evidence on the issue. Bawden & Assocs. v.
amounts recovered by the assignee apparently Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982).
inured to the benefit of the assignor, and there
In order for lots or parcels to qualify as
was no claim of prejudice to the judgment "known lots or parcels" within the meaning of
debtor resulting from the partial assignment Subdivision (eX3), requiring them to be sold
orfromthe execution sale based on the partial separately, the lots or parcels must be readily
assignment Oilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 identifiable to the sheriff conducting the sale.
(Utah 1981).
Beesley v. Hatch, 863 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1993).
—Prerequisites,
Setting aside.
Without an initialforeclosurejudgment, the
A sale which has been regularly held and
clerk has no basis upon which to calculate a fairly conducted should not be set aside merely
deficiency. Thus, the clerk cannot enter a defi- because a higher bid is offered later. Commerciency judgment and abeent such a judgment cial Bank v. Madsen, 120 Utah 619, 236 P.2d
he or she cannot properly issue a writ of execu- 343 (1951).
tion. Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan OperatTime of sale.
ing, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct App.), cert,
Sheriff conducting foreclosure sale may, in
denied, 796 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
his discretion, set such time for sale as he
—Stay,
chooses so long as it is within the limit preBankruptcy.
scribed by this section. Commercial Bank v.
Failure to assert bankruptcy as a defense is Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P^d 343 (1951).
not fatal to a later successful assertion of a —Postponement
discharge that postdates the judgment, so that
From Saturday or day before holiday.
a stay of execution of the judgment is proper
When a sale which was to be held on a Saturbased upon such discharge. Upton v. Heiselt
Constr. Co., 3 Utah 2d 170, 280 P.2d 971 day or the day before a holiday is postponed for
one day, such that additional notice is not nec(1966).
essary under Subdivision (eX2), the postpone—Timeliness.
Where the judgment was rendered on Octo- ment is, pursuant to Rule 6(a), until the next
business day. Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52,
ber 22,1971, and the execution sale took place
337 P.2d 429 (1969).
on Monday, October 22, 1979, the execution —Procedural requirements.
sale was timely. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469
The steps specified by Subdivision (eXD are
(Utah 1981).
necessary to levy on real property, and the exeTolling.
cution of a writ is not begun until the officer
Part payment or written acknowledgment of has begun to perform these steps. Taubert v.
a judgment does not toll the eight-year limita- Roberts, 747 PJ2d 1046 (Utah 1987).
tion period for serving process to enforce a
judgment by writ of execution. Yergensen v. Redemption.
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1966). —Amount to be paid.
"Necessary maintenance, upkeep, or
Order for appearance of judgment debtor.
repair."
—Issues raised.
Pre-redemption
expenses necessitated by an
Constitutionality.
Taxpayer who did not appeal a judgment order from the city to demolish the buildings
against him for underpayment of income taxes on the property were limited to those costs incould not raise the issue of the constitutional- curred in actually razing the building and in
ity of the tax in a supplemental proceeding filling the crawl space, and did not include the
whose purpose was to determine the location cost of filling the entire lot to raise its level to
and amount of taxpayer's property for purpose that of surrounding properties, or the cost of
of satisfying the judgment State Tax Comm. v. tree removal Galloway v. Merrill, 801 P.2d
942 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979).
Payment into court
Proceedings for sale of property.
The intent of Subdivision (f)(3) is to allow a
—Applicability of rule.
redemptioner to pay the funds into court so
Sales of property in partition proceedings that the holder of the certificate of sale cannot
should be governed by the statutes governing clog the equity of redemption by refusing to
partition, and not by Subdivision (e). Gillmor cooperate in the redemption process. Granada,
v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736 (Utah 1982).
Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985).
—Conduct of sale,
Waste.
Separate parcels.
No provision exists, in either 5 78-37-6 or
Description in deed of land as "Lots 1 and 2 Subdivision (f) of this rule, for the amount of
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waste committed by a purchaser to enter into
the formulation of the proper redemption
amount Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah
1991).
—Construction of rule.
Foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture,
which the law does not favor, and therefore,
rules and statutes dealing with redemption are
remedial in character and should be given a
liberal construction. United States v. Loosley,
661 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976).
—Effect
Restoration of property to same condition.
The general effect of a redemption by the
judgment debtor or his successor is that it restores the property to the same condition as if
no sale had been attempted. Bennion v. Amoss,
630 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975).
Waiver of irregularities.
By redeeming the property, debtor waived
and was estoppedfromasserting any irregularities in the foreclosure sale. Bennion v. Amoss,
630 P.2d 810 (Utah 1976).
—How made.
Defects in tender.
Where at time of tendered redemption payment by assignee of mortgagee to purchasers
at sheriffs sale no grounds for rejection were
made, subsequent claim that assignee's failure
to include copy of judgment and amount of lien
with payment was not deemed sufficient reason to reject tender. United States v. Loosley,
561 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976).
Substantial compliance.
If a debtor, acting in good faith, has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of this rule in such a manner that the
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely
affected, and is getting what he is entitled to,
the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor
of his property for mere falling short of exact
compliance with technicalities. United States
v. Loosley, 661 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976).
Substantial compliance is the proper test under Subdivision (f)(2). Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc. v.
Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990).
—Timeliness.
Extension of time.
A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate
instances extend the period for redemption
from sales on execution. Mollerup v. Storage
Sys. Intf1, 669 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977).
The matter of bankruptcy after foreclosure
and sale does not constitute grounds for extending the time of redemption from sales on
execution. Mollerup v. Storage Sys. Intfl, 569
P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977).
Final adjudication of rights.
Where assignee of mortgagor who purchased
prior to institution of foreclosure was not made
a party to the foreclosure proceedings and his
rights were not finally abjudicated until several months after foreclosure, he had six
months after such adjudication in which to re-
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deem. Carlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah 514, 248
P. 481, 47 AXJL 766 (1926).
Strict compliance.
The right of a purchaser at a sheriffs sale
either to receive the proper redemption
amount in accordance with Subdivision (f) or to
have the title perfected at the end of the sixmonth period is a substantive right Accordingly, strict compliance with the six-month redemption period is normally required. Huston
v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 631 (Utah 1991).
Attempted redemption by payment of the
purchase price, plus interest, six months after
sale followed by payment of the undisputed
portion of delinquent taxes more than two
months later neither strictly nor substantially
complied with Subdivision (0(3) and was properly denied as untimely. Springer v. Springer,
866 P.2d 358 (Utah 1993).
—Who may redeem.
Assignee of attorney's lien.
Assignee of recorded attorney's lien has
right to redeem property subject to that lien
from the purchaser at sheriffs sale following
mortgage foreclosure of the property. Downey
State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d
1286 (Utah 1978).
Assignee of creditor.
Where a grantee of the mortgagor took the
assignment of a sheriffs sale certificate from a
judgment creditor in aforeclosuresuit, instead
of taking a certificate of redemption, the assigned interest was sulgect to the redemption
rights of the assignee of a creditor having a
judgment lien subsequent to the foreclosure
Hen. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84,305 P.2d
882, modified on another point, 6 Utah 2d 268,
311 P.2d 791 (1957).
Bankruptcy trustee*
When a bankruptcy trustee was directed by
court order to abandon her interest in an oil
and gas well owned by the debtor, she necessarily abandoned any right to redeem that
might arise in the event of foreclosure. TechFluid Servs., Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc.,
787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Judgment debtor.
A judgment debtor can redeem from a judgment sale although he has parted with title
prior to the sale. Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d
77 (Utah 1975).
Remedies of purchaser.
—-Dispossession.
Scire facias.
Intent and purpose of statute on remedies of
dispossessed purchaser was to afford the relief
provided for by the common-law writ of scire
facias pertaining to the revival of judgments.
Continental Natfl Bank & Trust Co. v. John H.
Seely & Sons Co., 94 Utah 357, 77 P.2d 355,
115 A.L.R. 543 (1938).
—Failure to obtain possession.
Modification of judgment.
Subdivision (g)(2) was not applicable where
plaintiff obtained the property but wanted a
modification of the judgment Pitts -v.
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977).
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Cited in Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v.
Bonie, 13 Utah 2d 13, 367 P.2d 860 (1962);
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First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel
& Aaaocs., 600 P.2d 621 (Utah 1979).
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failure or insufficiency of notice to other interested party, 45 A.L.R.4th 447.
Judgment lien or levy of execution on one
joint tenants share or interest as severing joint
tenancy, 51 A.L.R.4th 906.
Validity, construction, and effect of body execution statutes allowing imprisonment based
on judgment, debt, or the like — modern cases,
79 AXIUth 232.
Propriety and effect of corporation's appearance pro se through agent who is not attorney,
8 AJLR.5th 653.
Key Numbers. — Execution *=* 1, 3, 35 et
seq., 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 78 et seq., 90, 127 et
seq., 185,222,223,226,238,241,281,282,285
et seq., 291, 293, 295, 296 et seq., 301, 305 et
seq., 348,373 et seq., 385 et seq., 390,395,402,
407 et seq., 421 et seq.; Judgments *» 632;
Waste e» 12.

Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court,
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof
may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vestincr it in nth**™
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and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in
whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon
application to the clerk.
Compiler^ Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 70, F.RC.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific PerAXJL — Lis pendens in suit to compel stock
formance § 179 et seq.
transfer, 48 A.L.R.4& 731.
C.J.S. — 81A C J.S. Specific Performance
Key Numbers. — Specific Performance *»
5§ 168 to 170.
181, 132.

Rule 71A. Process in behalf of and against persons not
parties.
When an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action,
he may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if he were a
party; and, when obedience to an order may be lawftdly enforced against a
person who is not a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing
obedience to the order as if he were a party.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 71, F.RC.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
i 767 et seq.

C.J.S.—49 CJS. Judgments § J 686 to 690.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 864, 866.

Rule 71B. Proceedings where parties not summoned.
(a) Effect of failure to serve all defendants. Where the action is against
two or more defendants and the summons is served on one or more, but not all
of them, the plaintiff may proceed against the defendants served in the same
manner as if they were the only defendants.
(b) Proceedings after judgment against parties not originally served.
When a judgment has been recovered against one or more, but not all, of
several persons jointly indebted upon an obligation, the plaintiff may require
any person not originally served with the summons to appear and show cause
why he should not be bound by the judgment in the same manner as though
he had been originally served with process.
(c) Summons and affidavit; contents and service. The plaintiff shall
issue a summons, describing the judgment, and requiring the defendant to
appear within the time required for appearance in response to an original
summons, and show cause why he should not be bound by such judgment The
summons, together with a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff to the
effect that the judgment, or some part thereof remains unsatisfied, and specifying the amount actually due thereon, shall be served upon the defendant
and returned in the same manner as the original summons.
(d) What constitutes the pleadings. The pleadings shall consist, of plaintiffs affidavit, the summons, and the answer of the defendant, if any; provided
that if defendant denies his liability on the obligation upon which the judgment was originally recovered, a copy of the original complaint and judgment
shall be included.
(e) Hearing; judgment. The matter may be tried as other cases; but if the
issues are found against the defendant, the judgment shall not exceed the
amount of the original judgment remaining unsatisfied, with interest and
costs.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
—«
•— tuia oiikiArt matter.

Cross-References. — Authorizing service
of process on other defendants, Rule 4(b).
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possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202,
141 P.2d 880 (1943).

Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R.
167 (1944).
Fact that one of defendants in forcible detainer action by lessee of state land had signed
purchase contract covering such land would
not>
'm i t s e l f ' m a k e h i m Pe™01""1/ ^able.
Pa*™ v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903
{
y Buchanari v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150
p u m
l g 4 ^ L R 16? (1944)

Liability,
— Lessor
Where without serving the three davs'notice
J^-^K <r^\^,vgr i
T A*?
required by § 78-36-3(1X0 a lessor entered the
premises of his tenant, whose rent was two
months in arrears, changed the locks on the
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter to Occupancy "within five days."
remove equipment and perishable goods, lessor _ Allegation.
was guilty of forcible detainer and conversion of
Allegation of "more* than five days includes
the personal property on the premises, p ^ ^ 0 f "within" five days. Woodbury v. BunPeterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 R2d 507 k e l . 9 8 U t a h 2 16, 98 R2d 948 (1940); American
<1965>Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318,
117 R 2 d 2 9 3
-PnrrhftflAr
(19*1), rehearing denied, 102
jrurcnaser.
^
p d
Q943)
v
;
Where purchaser of state land took posses•
sion of land while lessee from state was away "Unlawfully enters."
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he
"Unlawfully enters" in Subsection (2) means
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was
such purchaser should have made proper de- there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98
mand, and if it was refused, should have settled Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v.
question of possession by law. Paxton v. Fisher, Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 100,154 A.L.R.
86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. 167 (1944).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 1.
C J & . - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 1, 2.

Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and Detainer <*=» 5.

78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
life.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term
or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his
designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or
more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice
requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or
period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained
606
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premises, has remained uncompiied with for a period of three days after
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes
due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of t .e lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises,
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in
possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property,
served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncompiied with for three days after service. Within
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the
covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(lXd) are not
applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16
only.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, 5 1; 1986,
ch, 137,5 1; 1989, ch-101, § 1; 1992, ch. 141,
5 *•
Amendment Notes, - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "includ-

ing nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9,* in
Subsection (lXd) and added Subsection (3).
Cross-References. - Nuisances, Title 47.
Right to recover treble damages from tenants
committing waste, § 78-38-2.
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Treble damages.
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based on default in payment of rent survived
where tenant tendered rent due within three
days after service of unlawful detainer action,
regardless of defects in such notice. Dang v. Cox
Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982).

default in payment of rent, the judgment will
also mandate forfeiture of the lease. P. H. Inv. v.
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991).

— Prerequisites.
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to
cause of action. Carstensen v. Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944).
Service of the statutory notice and the tenant's noncompliance are prerequisites to the
tenant's being in unlawful detainer. Olympus
Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Landes, 821 P.2d
451 (Utah 1991).

— Administrative claim.
Notice to quit or pay rent served on government as required by this section was not an
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a), and federal court therefore
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer action brought under Federal Tbrt
Claims Act. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United
States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977).

— Presumptions.
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes absence of fraud and force, as well as existence of
relation of landlord and tenant. Holladay Coal
Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899).

— Liability of tenant.
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to
vacate premises did not terminate provision
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where
parties entered stipulation, while matter was
pending, that lessee considered lease in effect
and held under it after end of fixed term.
Milliner v. Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P.2d
151 (1970).

Notice to quit.

— When determined.
Whether a cause of action exists under this
section is to be determined at the time the
action is commenced. Van Zyverden v. Farrar,
15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).

— Prerequisites.
Notice in accordance with Subsection (lXe)
should precede notice to quit, and must be
uncomplied with for five days after the service
before a notice to quit is in order. Fireman's Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974).

— When exists.
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant
is subject to ouster by an unlawful detainer
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursuant to this section. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98
Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); American Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117
R2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah
328, 133 P.2d 332 (1943).
Unless tenant has retained the right to
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry
of premises for that purpose constitutes unlawful detainer. Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415,154
P.2d 642 (1944).
Federal regulations.
— Modification of state remedies.
OPA rental and housing regulations, under
Federal Price Control Act, were binding upon
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to
extent that such remedy was in conflict with
that act. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196
R2d 714 (1948).
In general.
This chapter takes away the landlord's common law right to use self-help to remove a
tenant, grants the landlord a summary court
proceeding to evict a tenant who has violated
some express or implied provision of the lease,
and provides five instances in which the tenant
is in unlawful detainer. The remedy for a successful landlord is restitution of the premises,
treble damages, and recovery for waste or rent
due. If the unlawful detainer action is based on

— Sufficiency.
A notice to quit is sufficient under Subsection
(1Kb) in the case of a tenancy at will, as
provided in contract of sale in case of default,
where it merely declares a forfeiture, and is not
insufficient under Subsection (lXe) because not
giving purchasers alternative of performing
conditions of the agreement. Forrester v. Cook,
77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); American
Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464
P2d 592 (1970).
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he
was violating substantial obligations of tenancy
by conducting certain businesses on premises,
and which plainly informed tenant that he
must desist from such objectionable practices
by certain date and that, if on or before that
date he failed to desist therefrom and had not
surrendered premises, action would be commenced for restitution of premises, was not
defective because notice was not expressed in
the alternative as required by Subsection (lXe)
of former § 104-60-3, i.e., that violation must
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was
plain intent of notice without use of word "or."
Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196 P.2d 714
(1948).
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had
failed to make payments of rent due under
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and further
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providing that tenants were to quit premises
and deliver up possession to landlord within
fifteen days did not comply with statutory requirements under this section; in absence of
compliance, landlord was not entitled to maintain action for restitution of premises. American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432,464
P.2d 592 (1970).
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to terminate a lease for breach of covenant, is not
sufficient to put lessee in unlawful detainer; the
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i.e.,
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes
subject to the provisions of this chapter.
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and
lessor was not entitled to maintain an action
under this section where lessor's notice to vacate premises was defective in that it did not
state that lessee had the alternative of paying
the delinquent rent or surrendering the premises. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852
(Utah 1979).
A notice to a month-to-month tenant to quit
the premises need not contain the alternative of
paying rent. Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981).
The critical distinction between a notice of
unlawful detainer and a notice of forfeiture is
that the notice of forfeiture simply declares a
termination of the lease without giving the
lessee the alternative of making up the deficiency. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah
1982).
Letter stating that "[i]n the event that [lessee] does not immediately re-open and continuously conduct normal business operations in
the premises, [lessor] will terminate the Lease
... as well as seek damages and all other
available legal relief for the breach" met the
requirements of Subsection (lXe). Olympus
Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food &
Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
— Tenancy at will.
At common law a tenant at will was not
entitled to notice to quit possession. Buchanan
v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154
A.L.R. 167 (1944).
It is only after buyer is in the status of a
tenant at will that he is amenable to the notice
provided by this section, which requires him to
vacate within five days or be guilty of an
unlawful detainer. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15
Utah 2d 367, 393 P2d 468 (1964).
Where lease was terminated by failure of
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant became a tenant at will and landlord properly
proceeded to regain possession by the procedure set forth in Subsection (1Kb) by giving
notice to vacate. Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invs., 14
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Utah 2d 250, 381 P.2d 735 (1963).
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant
at will for failure to make payment was sufficient under Subsection (lXe) even though several months had elapsed between first and final
notice. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Dennett, 24
Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 (1970).
Persons liable.
No one but tenant of real property for term
less than life can be guilty of unlawful detainer.
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P.
882 (1899).
Pleadings.
— Tenancy at will.
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner
could recover property on fifteen-day notice,
allegation in complaint that such tenant had
violated substantial obligations of rental agreement was not necessary in unlawful detainer
action. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196
P.2d 714 (1948).
Right of re-entry.
— Contractual provisions.
Under contract for sale and exchange of real
estate, providing that seller at his option could
re-enter premises and be released from his
obligations upon default of buyer, seller was
bound to give buyer notice of his intention to
take advantage of forfeiture provision of contract, since such provision was not self-executing. Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417,34 P.2d 699,
94 A.L.R. 1232 (1934).
Strict performance.
— Waiver.
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser's past-due
payments under uniform real estate contract,
and other conduct leading latter to believe that
strict performance would not be required by
vendor, imposes duty on vendor to give purchaser reasonable notice before vendor may
insist on strict performance by purchaser. Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403,195 P.2d
748 (1948).
Strict statutory compliance.
— Not required.
There is no reason for the strict rule that
landlord must demand the precise or exact
amount of rent due or lose his right to recover
possession of the premises. A tenant is guilty of
unlawful detainer when he continues in possession after default in payment of any rent, and
after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of
the premises, etc. Commercial Block Realty Co.
v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 505,
267 P. 1009 (1928).
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— Required.
This section, which provides a severe remedy,
must be strictly complied with before the cause
of action thereon may be maintained. Van
Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d
468 (1964).
Substantial compliance.
The substantial compliance doctrine applies
in some residential lease situations to defeat a
landlord's attempt to forfeit a lease because of a
tenant's minor breach. Housing Auth. v.
Delgado, 914 R2d 1163 (Utah Ct App. 1996).
The substantial compliance doctrine furthers
the courts' general policy disfavoring forfeitures by allowing equity to intervene and rescue a lessee from forfeiture of a lease when the
lessee has substantially complied with the
lease in good faith. Housing Auth. v. Delgado,
914 R2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Trial court correctly determined that the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance applies to residential leases in Utah, and its
findings that defendant had substantially complied with lease at issue was supported by
adequate evidence. Housing Auth. v. Delgado,
914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Termination of lease.
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow,
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982).

sale of real estate, where the vendors gave
notice of forfeiture of the contract only and did
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up
or quit, as is required under this section, the
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961).
— Intervenor.
A person not actually occupying the premises
who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
— Lease.
Under a lease contract for a period of years,
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the
lessor for the lessees to quit the premises was
not sufficient for treble damages. Under such a
lease the statutes require an alternative notice
that the tenant either perform or quit before he
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954).

Treble damages.
— Contract of sale.
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jar. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and against assigning or subletting without lessor's
Tenant § 352 et seq.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord consent, 71 AX.R.3d 780.
and Tenant § 264 et seq.
Express or implied restriction on lessee's use
CJJS. - 52A C J.S. Landlord and Tenant of residential property for business purposes,
46AXJR.4th496.
§ 758,
Landlord's permitting third party to occupy
AXJL — Right of landlord legally entitled to
possession to dispossess tenant without legal premises rent-free as acceptance of tenant's
surrender of premises, 18 AX.R.5th 437.
process, 6 AX.R.3d 177.
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=»
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation
of covenant in lease or provision of statute 290.

78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and
shall be entitled to hold tinder the terms of the lease for another full year, and
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding
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1998

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 0902686
0902686 _ A

vs.
UAW PROPERTIES, L.C., at al.,
Defendants.
UAW PROPERTIES, L.C.; DLM
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C.,
CounterclaiMants,
vs.
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS
Counterdefendant.
This matter was tried to the Court on April 13, 1998. At that
time the Court received testimony, heard oral argument, and having
taken the matter under advisement, now finds and rules as follows:
The plaintiff attacks the Judgment foreclosure sale on the
subject property by first saying that it did not receive adequate
notice of the sale. The Court finds that adequate notice was given
in that notice was sent to the address used by plaintiff when it
instituted the small claims action which initially gave rise to the
Judgment, when notice was posted on the property, left at the
manager's office, and further when published as required by law.

SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES

PAGE TWO
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Plaintiff also attacks the Judgment by arguing that the
execution sale was not authorized by the Schwichts.

The Court

finds that Mr. Olsen was authorized to act on behalf of Mr. Hagen,
who was authorized by the Schwichts to collect on the Judgment.
Plaintiff argues that a settlement agreement had been reached
between plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Olsen prior to the sale.

The

Court finds that no settlement agreement had been reached and that
Mr. Olsen had agreed to stop the sale of the property only if he
had received payment on the Judgment prior to the sale.
Plaintiff also argues that the underlying Judgment is against
a nonexistent party. The Court rejects this argument. The initial
action against the Schwichts was brought by plaintiffs in the name
of Shangri-La Garden Apartments, UBO.

Plaintiff brought this

action in the name of Shangri-La Garden Apartments.

Stanley Wade

has filed an Affidavit indicating he is the sole trustee of
Shangri-La Garden Apartments, UBO. A subsequent action against the
Schwichts for fraud was filed in the name of Shangri-La Garden
Apartments, Inc. The Complaint in this matter, which is signed by
Stanley Wade as trustee for Shangri-La Garden Apartments, alleges
that "Shangri-La Garden Apartments" as plaintiff was the "sole and
exclusive fee owner of the property...."

The Court is of the

opinion that under all of the circumstances of this case, that the

SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES

Judgment was obtained
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against the owner of the property

in

question.
Plaintiff argues that the Writs of Execution were issued
improperly because of the addition of attorney's fees.

It should

be noted, however, that the plaintiff accepted and cashed, without
objection, the check for the excess proceeds it received from the
sheriff's sale.
In any event, the Court feels that the arguments made by
plaintiff to invalidate the sale are an impermissible collateral
attack on the Judgment.

The Court finds that the execution sale

was valid.
The Court turns to the question of equitable redemption. The
Court finds in this case that the plaintiff, through Mr. Wade, had
notice of the execution sale prior to the sale.

The Court also

finds that the plaintiff, through Mr. Stan Wade, knew by September
19, 1996 or within a few short days thereafter that the property
had been sold and that there would need to be a redemption.
Clearly, Mr. Henderson, Shangri-La1s attorney, knew by September
19, 1996 that the sheriff's sale had taken place. That is the date
that he wrote to Mr. Wade advising Mr. Wade that he had received
back the check from Mr. Olsen which was intended to pay the
Judgment, and advising Mr. Wade that there would need to be a

SHANGRI-LA V. UAW PROPERTIES
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redemption. This information known to Mr. Henderson, as Mr. Wadefs
attorney, would be charged to Mr. Wade.
Having made the foregoing findings, the Court is nevertheless
of the opinion that the redemption period should be extended in
this case and that the equitable redemption sought by the plaintiff
should be allowed.

The enormous discrepancy between the value of

the property and the amount for which the property was purchased
compels the Court to this result. It should be noted that Mr. Wade
did indeed make efforts to pay the Judgment prior to the sherifffs
sale, and quite certainly was under the impression that that had
been accomplished through his attorney, Mr. Henderson.

It is

inexplicable to the Court why, having received information from Mr.
Henderson that the sale had taken place, the plaintiff did not take
immediate steps to redeem the property. Mr. Wade and his wife have
owned, developed and cared for this property for over 25 years.
The Court feels that the circumstances of this case are exceptional
and that it would shock the conscience of the Court to allow this
$4.2 million piece of property to be purchased for $8,000.
The defendants point to the fact that Mr. Wade has been
dilatory in this case by not complying with discovery rules. While
that may or may not be so, there are remedies for such conduct and
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the Court has not considered those in determining the equities
bearing on the equitable redemption issue.
The Court is of the opinion that defendants UAW Properties and
DLM Investments are entitled to a return of their purchase price,
plus attorney's fees incurred and taxes paid on the property#
together with rents received on the property from the time of their
purchase until the time of trial, which appears to be the amount of
$304,333.

Defendants claim that that amount should be trebled.

The Court feels that the parties did not adequately address that
issue and will ask defendants to file a short brief within ten (10)
days hereof arguing for the trebling of damages.

Plaintiff will

then have ten (10) days thereafter within which to file its brief,
and then defendants may have five (5) days thereafter to file a
reply.

Defendants should then file a "Notice to Submit".

The parties have stipulated that the attorneyfs fees could be
reserved. Counsel for defendants are to prepare their Affidavit of
Attorneys Fees within ten (10) days. Plaintiff will then have ten
(10) days thereafter if they wish to respond, at which time the
Court will rule.
Counsel for defendants UAW Properties and DLM Investments is
to prepare a more detailed set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, together with an Order and Judgment, and submit it to
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opposing counsel for approval as to form, and then to this Court
for signature.
Dated this

g
_day of May, 1998.

G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDG

1~ 1
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
May, 1998:

Shawn Turner, Esq.
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Thomas J. Klc, Esq.
4725 S. Holladay Blvd., Suite 110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Stephen B. Mitchell
Attorney for Defendants UAW and DLM
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of
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SHAWN D. TURNER (5813)
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counterdefendant
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 263-2900

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS,
Plaintiffs,

RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM OF
DEFENDANT'S UAW PROPERTIES, L.C.
AND DLM INVESTMENTS, L.L.C.
RE: TREBLED DAMAGES

vs.

UAW PROPERTIES, L.C, et al.,
Defendants.

UAW PROPERTIES, L.C, et al.,
Counterclaimants,
vs
SHANGRI-LA GARDEN APARTMENTS, :
Counterdefendants.

Civil No. 970902686QT
Judge Frank G. Noel

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and pursuant to order of the court
do hereby respond to the Memorandum of Defendant's UAW Properties, L.C. and DLM
Investments, L.L.C. Re: Trebled Damages.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO TREBLED DAMAGES.
A.

The Unlawful Detainer Statute Does Not Apply in this Case.
Defendants claim that they are entitled to trebled damages under UCA § 78-36-3 et.

seq. The unlawful detainer statutes however do not apply to the Plaintiff in this case.
By its express language the statute applies only to unlawful detainer "by a tenant for
a term less than life." The Plaintiffs in this action are not now nor have they ever been tenants of
the property in question.
It is one of the most well defined principles of statutory construction that a statute is
to be construed according to its plain language. The plain language of the statute here makes it
applicable only to tenants of real property. Under no stretch of the imagination could the Plaintiffs
in this action be considered tenants and therefore the statute is inapplicable and Defendants are not
entitled to trebled damages.
B.

Even If Plaintiffs Were Tenants, They Would Not Be an Unlawful Detainer.
If by some stretch of the imagination the Plaintiffs could be termed as tenants they

still would not be in unlawful detainer. Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-9 provides:
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On the trial of any proceedings for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the Plaintiffs shall
only be required to show in addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained of,
that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was
entitled to the possession att he time of the forcible detainer. The Defendant may show in his
defense that he or his ancestors or those whose interests in such premises he claims, had been
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next before the
commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein has not been ended or
determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings.
The undisputed facts at the time of the trial show that Plaintiffs have been in
possession for much longer than one year prior to the commencement of these proceedings. The
courts finding that the Plaintiff has a right to equitable redemption clearly is a finding that the
interest of the Plaintiff had not yet been determined and has not yet ended. Under these
circumstances it is the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants who have prevailed on this issue and it is
the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants who is entitled to their attorneys fees in having had to defend
the same.
C.

The Court Has Not Found an Unlawful Detainer.
In the Memorandum Decision of the Court, there has been no finding that an unlawful

detainer on the part of the Plaintiff.
In light of the fact that there has been no finding of an unlawful detainer the
Defendants are not entitled to trebled damages which are solely based on such a conclusion of law.
Accordingly the request for trebled damages must be denied.

3

-1..1

H.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED ATTORNEY FEES.
Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this action. It was Plaintiffs who claimed they were

entitled to possession of the property pursuant to the doctrine of equitable redemption and it was the
defendants who opposed that. There is no contract between the parties and there is no statute which
provides for the awarding of attorneys fees to the Defendants in this action.
There are two purported bases for the potential award of attorneys fees in this action. One
would be the unlawful detainer statute which, as shown above, either does not apply or under which
the Plaintiffs are in fact the prevailing party and therefore Defendants are not entitled to fees under
that statute. The secondary potential source for award of attorneys fees would be the doctrine of
equitable redemption itself The cases for equitable redemption provide that the party seeking to
redeem should be required to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses of the other party. Those
expenses can not and should not include the costs of the party opposing the suit itself. The only
attorneys fees that should be awardable would be those fees incurred in the actual purchase of the
property. Where, as in this case, the Defendants did not purchase the property at the auction, the
awardable fees would be those fees which they incurred in acquiring the property from the parties
who purchased the property at auction. A review of the Affidavit of Steven B. Mitchell discloses that
there are no attorneys fees that have been charged for that particular item. Accordingly, none of the
requested attorneys fees should be awarded.
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DATED this

day of May, 1998
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER

Shawn D. Turner
SHANGRI DAM

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
^L

I hereby certify that on this £?o day of May, 1998, I mailed postage prepaid a copy of
the foregoing document to the following:
Richard Burbidge, Esq.
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq.
Burbidge & Mitchell
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103
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D. Kendall Perkins USB#2566
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2417 East 9110 South
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 942-2078
Fax: (801)942-2703
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CRESTWOOD COVE APARTMENTS
BUSINESS TRUST, dba COTTONWOOD :
CREEK APARTMENTS and SHANGRI LA
UBO,
:

AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY L. WADE

vs.

:

Case No. 020911135

:

Judge: Robin W. Reese

SHAWN TURNER and LARSEN
KIRKHAM& TURNER
Defendants
After having been duly sworn, Stanley L. Wade hereby deposes and says:
1.

At all material times, he was involved with and knowledgeable about events occurring in
and about the Shangri La Apartments property and is able to state the following from his
own personal knowledge.

2.

After the Court entered its judgment in the matter of Shangri-La Garden Apartments vs
UAW Properties et. al. on or about July 29, 1998, Plaintiffs were unable to raise the
nearly $1,000,000 redemption fee and Defendants took possession of the Shangri La
Apartment complex during about December 1998 and installed their own managers.

3.

Defendants and their agents did not screen new tenants effectively and allowed a lower
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quality of tenants to begin to occupy apartments at Shangri La. Defendants and their
agents did not effectively manage the apartments. The result of this being that the tenants
began to damage the apartments and did not dependably pay rent as they were obligated
to do. The damage done was not repaired in a timely manner and the tenants were not
held responsible for the damage done.
4.

Defendants took the rent monies and monies generated by the on site coin operated
washers and dryers and failed to pay the necessary expenses of the apartments thereby
causing two detrimental results: the premises were not repaired and maintained as
required; and certain repairs and ongoing expenses were not paid which caused the
creditors to file liens against the property, all of which were resulting in an ongoing
diminution of value of the property.

5.

A fire occurred in one of the apartment buildings causing heavy damage to several
apartments. Fire and resultant water damages occurred to the roof, insulation, ceilings,
walls, windows, wiring, cabinets and floors of said apartments. Defendants had a partial
roof repair done to keep weather out, but did not have the remaining damage repaired so
as to allow re-renting of said apartments and replacement of the cash flow attributable
thereto. Other than the roof, Defendants did not use the fire insurance proceeds resulting
from said fire to repair the damaged apartments but took steps to divert said proceeds to
their own use.

6.

Defendants allowed the carports and fences appurtenant to said apartments to be damaged

2

without attempting to identify and impose responsibility on the parties causing the
damage and without repairing the damage.
Approximately 18 months after having filed an appeal from the outcome at trial, and
having observed the deterioration of the property and attendant diminution in value
during the time the apartment property was in the hands of U.A.W. Properties, L.C. and
DLM Investments, L.L.C., the matter was discussed with counsel. Said counsel indicated
that the matter may not be scheduled for hearing by the Supreme Court for two or more
years. Therefore, pursuant to advise of counsel, and to avoid further damage and
diminution in value, Affiant deemed it to be a business necessity to negotiate a settlement
agreement with U.A.W. Properties, L.C. and DLM Investments, L.L.C. in order to be able
to end the progressive deterioration of the property. Said Settlement resulted in Plaintiffs
again taking possession of the apartments and to be able to begin to repair and rehabilitate
the premises and turn around a stream of events that had been resulting in a constant
diminution of value thereof.
Dated this Z Z _ day of (3~&Z$~<

2003.

Stanley L
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
NOTARY PUBLIC
Re^iding^at:.

IpfLj^A
D. Kendall Perkins
Attorney for Plaintiffs

AyofKMM>03.
NOTARY PUBLIC
ROBYN CURRAH
3880 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
MY Commission Expires
April10.2005
STATE OF UTAH

